Originally published by Vox All. By Andrew Prokop.
When a party loses badly in an election cycle, what typically ensues is a frenzy of finger-pointing as different voices and factions advance their theory of what went wrong.
In the wake of the 2026 blue tsunami, Democrats have a happier problem: They get to argue over who gets most credit for this smashing win.
Indeed, prominent members of the two main sides in the party’s long-simmering civil war — progressives and moderates — barely paused to take a breath before arguing that the results precisely vindicated their theories of what American voters want, what makes for effective politics, and where the Democratic Party should go.
Key takeaways
- Moderates point out that most Democrats who flipped key Senate states distanced themselves from progressives and the left on some issues, and argue that more solidly progressive candidates won by less impressive margins.
- Progressives point out that winning Democratic candidates, even in red states, embraced the rhetoric of economic populism, criticizing billionaires and corporations.
- Progressives argue that only major structural reforms to the economy can satisfy voters; moderates are urging a more limited focus on the cost of living.
- Democratic leaders will have to decide whose case is more persuasive as they shape the party’s governing agenda.
The progressives say that winning candidates broadly ran on bold economic populist platforms, frequently criticizing billionaires and corporations. They point out that some very progressive or left candidates won in tough territory. And they say the results vindicate their preference for fiercely resisting the Trump administration rather than compromising with it.
“By and large, Democratic winners check two boxes,” Adam Green of the Progressive Change Campaign Committee told me. “One is fighting the status quo and being believed when they say they want to shake up a broken economic and political system. The second is challenging corporate power. That’s been a throughline everywhere.”
The moderates, in contrast, argue that candidates who flipped key House and Senate seats are in key ways moderate. They say that the most progressive candidates in tough races tended to underperform the national trend. And they point out that, since 2024, Democrats across the party have recalibrated on issues like climate change, border security, crime, and identity issues, to get better in touch with voter concerns — a win for moderation, they say.
“It’s pretty clear that the majorities we enjoy now were made by moderates,” Matt Bennett, co-founder of the center-left group Third Way, told me. “Just in terms of how these people ran in South Carolina and Mississippi and Alaska and Iowa — they did not run as full-throated progressives.”
These arguments may sound a bit petty, and sometimes they are. But the stakes are actually quite high, because the lessons Democrats take from these midterms — the story they agree to tell themselves about why they won — will shape their choices about how to govern.
If the moderates win the day, we can expect the next Democratic majorities — and perhaps the next presidential nominee — to have a cautious approach, carefully gauging the state of public opinion and trying not to get carried away by progressive advocacy or passions.
But if the progressives make a convincing case that a bolder approach can spur sweeping electoral victories, they’ll be able to more effectively argue that the party should go big — in its clashes with the Trump administration, in legislation, in the 2028 presidential race, and in the next Democratic presidency.
Did moderates do better than progressives?
The first problem with adjudicating this debate: There’s no agreement on which candidate fits into which camp.
Is Annie Andrews, Democrats’ victorious Senate candidate in South Carolina, a bold progressive because of her longtime gun control support, her history of spicy partisan commentary on social media, and her criticism of Israel’s war on Gaza?
Or is Andrews a moderate because she supports a constitutional amendment requiring the US to have a balanced budget, she ran an ad saying she opposed “biological men playing in women’s sports,” she opposed Medicare for All, and she criticized the Democratic Socialists of America as “un-American and “unhinged”?
The reality is that Andrews, like several other Democratic candidates who flipped key Senate races, is a bit like the classic optical illusion that can look like either a rabbit or a duck, depending on where you focus.
They aren’t old-style moderates from central casting. But they did distance themselves from progressives and the left on certain topics — most often, in opposing Medicare-for-all, on trans issues involving children and sports, and in criticizing the Biden administration’s border security record (which, notably, even progressive Sen.-elect Abdul El-Sayed did).
Liam Kerr, of the center-left group Welcome PAC, pointed to Josh Turek in Iowa and Adam Hamilton in Kansas. “Josh Turek said, ‘I’m a proud moderate and I’m running a radically centrist campaign.’ Adam Hamilton said he’s a self-described centrist against the extremes — the extremes, plural,” Kerr told me.
There were, however, Senate candidates who much more ambiguously came out of the party’s left faction — such as El-Sayed in Michigan, Peggy Flanagan in Minnesota, Troy Jackson in Maine, and democratic socialist Angie Nixon in Florida. All but Nixon won their races.
But, electoral analysts like the New York Times’ Nate Cohn argue, all also “underperformed” the national trend. (El-Sayed, for instance, won Michigan by seven when Democrats won nationally by 14 points.)
“Many of the weakest Democratic results — those where the party fared relatively poorly given the national environment and the characteristics of the state or district — came in races where Democrats picked progressive candidates in contested nominating fights this summer,” Cohn wrote.
Still, other analysts, such as the leftist commentator Matt Bruenig, have pushed back, arguing that progressive underperformance was often small, inconsistent, or explained by more context. Nixon, for instance, lost her Senate race in Florida by 2.9 points, while the more mainstream Democratic nominee David Jolly, a former Republican Congress member, lost the governor’s race by 1.3 points.
Is everyone an economic populist now?
The most common pushback from progressives to the “moderates did better” argument is to argue that the supposed moderates in fact ran as quite progressive when it comes to economic issues — and that they made criticism of billionaires and corrupt corporate interests central to their message.
“Democrats won by being populist economic fighters who were unafraid to call out the corrupt politicians and corporate interests who have rigged the system at the expense of everyone else,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren wrote in an op-ed two days after the midterms.
Warren cited many examples of victorious candidates in key red state races rhetorically calling out billionaires and corporations, advocating for economic power, criticizing a rigged system, and calling for policies like blocking grocery store mergers and breaking up healthcare monopolies.
Bharat Ramamurti, a former aide to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, told me: “Whether it was in South Carolina or Iowa or Kansas, candidates were saying a pretty comparable message to what we were saying in Maine and Michigan — or even in very blue states — about what my old boss would call a rigged system.”
The relative moderates I interviewed tended to agree that a shift had occurred, though some had different interpretations of what it meant.
Adam Jentleson, a former Democratic Senate aide and founder of the center-left Searchlight Institute, largely endorsed the shift. He told me Democrats have always been strongest when they “lean hard into economic populism, but have some flexibility on other issues,” an approach his group describes as “heterodoxy.”
Third Way’s Bennett tried to draw a distinction between what he called Bernie Sanders’s “shotgun populism” — which he characterized as “rich people are the problem, all of them are bad” — versus Georgia Sen. Jon Ossoff’s “rifle shot approach,” in which “specific people and organizations are the problem, not everybody who is wealthy.” (Bennett prefers the latter.)
Yet Green, of the Progressive Change Campaign Committee, argued to me that the moderates were now belatedly embracing economic populism because progressives won the argument.
“The people who Third Way calls ‘moderate’ basically ran on the [Zohran] Mamdani message of tying billionaire power and corruption to people’s higher prices,” Green said. “If they want to call that moderate, great! That means we won the battle of ideas.”
Complicating things is that Democrats have long incorporated some of the themes from this year’s midterms: Every modern Democratic president, from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama to Joe Biden, ran on taxing the rich, expanding benefits, and standing up for the little guy in some fashion, even as their policy agenda and tone differed from each other and from politicians like Sanders.
Do the voters want a laser focus on lower prices — or do they want more ambitious progressive reforms to reshape the economy?
But even if there’s general agreement that many candidates won on a message of “affordability” or even economic populism, there’s much more disagreement on how to translate that into policies that will deliver voters what they want.
Several progressives I interviewed argued that voter concern about affordability should not be misread as an exclusive focus on gas and grocery prices. Voters who rejected the status quo want to crack down on corporate influence writ large, build a more expansive safety net, and make deep changes to how power is distributed, they said.
“Everybody wants to call this the affordability moment, the cost of living crisis. Yes, people have been experiencing — having a hard time making ends meet, rent, groceries, etcetera. But I truly believe it is more than that,” Elizabeth Wilkins, president of the progressive think tank the Roosevelt Institute, told me. “People are experiencing a deep sense of precarity and anxiety about their economic future.”
Wilkins said that Democrats should be wary of “incrementalist approaches” that fail to “restructure power for the long haul.” The next Democratic agenda, she said, should try to “demonstrate to people that we are willing to take on the existing power structure.”
Ramamurti pointed me to an article he wrote warning of the “affordability mirage,” and said the public’s concerns were deeper. “These concerns, in my mind, are not just purely about affordability,” he said. “They are structural concerns about how the economy is set up, and about the unresponsiveness of our political institutions to the concerns of the public.”
Both Wilkins and Ramamurti pointed to sectoral bargaining — that is, letting workers across entire industries collectively bargain together, rather than separately in each company — as an example of a major reform that could alter the balance of power between workers and employers.
Yet moderates and those on the center-left argue that the party should take the polls in which voters consistently complain about the cost of living quite literally.
“The American people do not want to pay for your political project,” Jerusalem Demsas, founder of the liberal publication The Argument (and a former Vox colleague), wrote Wednesday. “The 2024 and 2026 electorates spoke as clearly as possible: They are mad about the price of consumer goods and services.”
Per this line of thinking, Democrats should not attempt to claim a mandate to tear down the existing economic system, but should rather focus on trying to actually address voters’ cost concerns — for instance, by passing the permitting reform bill that congressional Democrats are currently divided over, since that could help bring down energy prices.
For now, just as candidates often sang from the same hymnal on the trail, there’s more overlap between left and center than you might expect. Speaker-in-waiting Hakeem Jeffries has backed a healthcare agenda, for example, that would both reverse Trump’s Medicaid and Affordable Care Act cuts and implement a Sanders-backed plan to lower the Medicare age to 55 and add new benefits like dental care.
But that unity may be harder to maintain over time, especially if Democrats acquire the presidency after 2028 and their bills have a greater chance of becoming law. That’s partly because, as some moderates emphasize, progressives’ dreams of big new spending programs are going to crash headlong into the country’s huge deficit problem — which, they say, is connected to the cost-of-living problem, since it’s associated with higher interest rates on home mortgages and car loans. Making matters more difficult, many of the same Democrats adopted anti-tax positions that could make it harder to raise revenue.
Another problem: Bringing down broad, economy-wide prices is very difficult unless a recession hits. “The actual policy levers at your disposal to actually bring down prices don’t tend to be great,” Jentleson told me.
So Democrats are torn between those urging a focus on voter concerns that are impossible to satisfy and those trying to deliver major economic changes the voters may not really want. What could go wrong?
