Ahead of the first trilateral summit between Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen, commentators asked whether it would be “Yalta 2.0”: a meeting where three major powers divided the world and determined the fate of smaller nations. Asked about the comparison, Putin paused and nodded. Xi urged the leaders to reject “Cold War thinking” and recalled that they had “fought side by side” during World War II. “when major countries live in harmony, the world enjoys peace; when major countries clash, the world falls into turmoil,” he said.

The summit produced the China-Russia-US Declaration toward Peace, not the division some had predicted. It also brought together two leaders caught in wars they could not bring to a satisfactory end, while China was fighting neither. Beijing had the influence to affect the conflicts, but had chosen not to use it, the article argues.

Trump arrived after a midterm defeat that handed both chambers of Congress to the Democrats. He was also waging a war against Iran that he could not win outright. Since the conflict erupted in February, it had rattled oil and energy supplies, drawn in Yemen’s Houthis and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. By one account, Trump had come seeking achievements rather than votes, as his options narrowed. Putin arrived with Russia’s war in Ukraine in its fifth year, isolated by the West and facing an economy losing momentum.

Ukraine was on the summit agenda at the initiative of the American president. But US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner travelled to Berlin to brief Ukrainian and European leaders, who were determined not to be left out of decisions about the war. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, waiting for their briefing, said issues concerning Ukraine must be decided with Ukraine, and those concerning Europe, with Europe. Any agreement reached in Shenzhen would still have to address the demands of those directly involved in the conflict.

China’s position on Ukraine provides another view of the war. Chinese officials have posed a counterfactual: had China chosen to arm Russia, the front would not look as it does today. Strategists describe Beijing’s approach as “constructive neutrality”, arguing that openly taking sides would have widened the war, while China’s red lines lowered the nuclear temperature.

The fighting continued as the leaders met. Russian drones hit Kharkiv, while Ukraine struck oil facilities in Tatarstan and hit the Kerch Bridge for the third time in a week. The article says the war was being decided on the ground, not at the diplomatic table, limiting what the Shenzhen meeting could settle.

China’s reluctance to accept commitments on other powers’ terms also emerged in nuclear discussions. Washington has long sought a trilateral nuclear arms control framework with Russia and China, but Beijing has refused to participate on equal terms. China’s arsenal is estimated at 620 warheads, compared with about 5,000 each in the American and Russian stockpiles; Beijing cites the disparity in declining equal terms.

The declaration covered UN reform, more refined oil supply, opposition to what the leaders described as abuses of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court, and a pledge that a nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought”. Critics called it the lowest common denominator. The article says the declaration had limited substance, but Beijing convened the other two powers on its own terms without agreeing to the division of the world some had anticipated.

The article compares China’s current position with that of the United States before 1914 and before 1939, arguing that restraint can set terms more than force. It describes China as the world’s largest economy on purchasing-power terms, with a manufacturing base roughly equal to the G7 combined and a military leading in a growing list of categories. China could alter the course of the wars being fought, the article says, which each run through Beijing in different ways: Ukraine, the confrontation with Iran and turbulence across the Middle East.

Beijing’s treatment of Trump at the summit also drew attention. Though diminished at home and abroad, he was given centre stage, welcomed on the tarmac, seated at the front of the group photograph and hosted at a state banquet. The article argues that offering him dignity was not submission, but a way for Beijing to conserve its leverage.

China also faces vulnerabilities, including a tightening security arc along its periphery, a property market still working through weakness, youth employment problems and a military reckoning with corruption. The article says Beijing’s “constructive” posture partly reflects a judgement that exercising its influence too freely could expose its limits.

The article argues that smaller economies in the region may benefit from China’s restraint, despite having had no role in negotiating it. It contrasts Yalta, where powers carved up a world they later fought over, with Shenzhen, where leaders unable to finish their wars met a power that could tip the balance but chose not to. Xi said the seeds planted at the meeting would eventually bear fruit, a bet rather than a result.

The “Yalta 2.0” label persists because it is a flattering story, the article concludes, but Shenzhen showed a world being balanced rather than governed. It argues that Xi’s greatest power may lie in the wars China has chosen not to enter and in its refusal to end them on terms set by others.