The United States’ decision to end South Africa’s and Rwanda’s eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) from January 1, 2027, highlights the risks of relying on trade preferences that Washington can withdraw, writes Hakeem Najimdeen.
On September 2, United States President Donald Trump signed legislation extending AGOA through the end of 2028, following overwhelming support in Congress. Two months later, on November 2, his administration announced plans to terminate South Africa’s and Rwanda’s eligibility from January 1, 2027.
AGOA, enacted on May 18, 2000, currently covers 33 eligible sub-Saharan African countries. It allows them to export thousands of products to the US market duty-free and was promoted as a way to foster economic growth, expand US-Africa trade and encourage economic and political reforms.
The programme is estimated to have supported more than 300,000 direct jobs across Africa and 1.3 million indirect jobs. A 2024 US Trade Representative report said two-way goods trade between the US and sub-Saharan Africa reached $47.5bn in 2023. This included $9.7bn in imports under AGOA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), of which $5.5bn consisted of non-oil products such as apparel and agricultural goods.
More recent figures point to challenges. A Congressional Research Service report shows US imports receiving AGOA duty-free treatment fell from $7.9bn in 2024 to $5bn in 2025. The German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) reported that the share of US imports from sub-Saharan Africa benefiting from AGOA and GSP preferences fell from more than 80 percent in 2008 to roughly 24.7 percent in 2021, amid eligibility uncertainty and short renewal windows.
Only a few eligible countries capture most of AGOA’s benefits. South Africa is the programme’s largest beneficiary, with exports to the US worth billions of dollars annually, while many other eligible countries struggle to make full use of its preferences.
Because the US administers AGOA unilaterally rather than through a bilateral treaty, Washington can exclude or reinstate eligible countries based on its own assessments and criteria, including market reforms, human rights and labour standards. Ethiopia’s suspension in 2022, for instance, led to the loss of thousands of garment sector jobs.
The author argues that Washington’s geopolitical interests often carry more weight in eligibility decisions than AGOA’s stated criteria. South Africa has strengthened economic and political ties with US rivals such as China and Russia, while facing accusations from Washington of obstructing American trade and investment, alongside Trump’s allegations of a “white genocide”.
Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has also brought it into conflict with US interests in the region’s critical minerals.
Falling AGOA import values, unstable US trade policies and short-term extensions leave African exporters vulnerable, the article says. Losing access triggers immediate customs setbacks, including tariff increases of 15 to 20 percent on some products. The author argues that unpredictable extensions hinder the development of a self-sustaining African industrial base and make accelerated implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) an urgent priority.
The AfCFTA is a trade agreement signed under the auspices of the African Union (AU) on March 21, 2018, in Kigali, Rwanda. It entered into force on May 30, 2019, with trading beginning on January 1, 2021. The agreement aims to bring AU member states into a unified market of over 1.3 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) exceeding $3.4 trillion.
A larger regional market could mitigate external shocks, including the revocation of preferential trade agreements such as AGOA or the sudden imposition of steep tariffs. Trade between African nations currently accounts for about 15–18 percent of the continent’s total trade. The AfCFTA aims to progressively eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of tariff lines, stimulating internal commerce and buffering the continent against declines in Western markets caused by tariff fluctuations.
The article says AGOA and other external agreements have largely kept Africa in the role of a raw material supplier, while the AfCFTA encourages regional value chains. Under this model, one African country might produce raw materials, another process them into finished goods, and the final product be sold to consumers on the continent with fewer tariff barriers.
AfCFTA trade initiatives now include South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tunisia, which are using its preferential tariff arrangements. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), launched on January 13, 2022, enables banks and financial institutions to conduct cross-border transactions in African currencies, reducing reliance on foreign currencies such as the US dollar.
The AU adopted protocols on competition policy in February 2023 and digital trade in February 2024, aimed at promoting fair competition and facilitating e-commerce. In August 2026, the AfCFTA Secretariat signed an agreement to modernise and digitise customs systems. The AfCFTA Adjustment Fund has also been activated, with an estimated financing requirement of $8bn–$10bn, to support developing countries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) adapting to the single market.
The author says the continent needs to accelerate integration by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and harmonising trade and regulatory policies. African countries also need to invest in cross-border infrastructure to lower the cost of moving goods and services, including digital energy grids, roads and railways.
The article concludes that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials and develop regional value chains focused on local manufacturing and innovation. Meeting the needs of the continent’s vast market, it argues, would strengthen economic self-sufficiency and reduce vulnerability to external political decisions and the expiration of unilateral trade agreements.
The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
