The US-Israel war on Iran could settle into a prolonged standoff, with fighting reduced but no political agreement in sight. Analysts say Washington and Tehran remain far apart, while a naval blockade and attacks around the Strait of Hormuz continue to raise the risk of escalation.

US President Donald Trump has sent mixed signals about the war. He wrote on Truth Social that Washington did not need a deal with Iran, saying: “We don’t need a deal with Iran,” and, “Those days have long since passed. We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!” He also directed Vice President JD Vance to focus on what he called “corruption and crime” in Democratic-run cities. Vance led talks with Iran that produced a short-lived truce in June.

Trump had earlier described the war as “militarily … effectively over”, while warning he “would not hesitate” to resume strikes if diplomacy failed. Vance blamed the Republicans’ heavy losses in the November 3 midterm elections on the unpopular war and its economic consequences, including rising fuel prices.

Observers say the mixed messages point to disagreement within the Republican Party over whether to leave the conflict unresolved. That could mean maintaining the US naval blockade of Iranian ports and sanctions—both red lines for Iran. Tehran has said it will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz or resume peace talks until these measures are lifted, among other demands.

On November 9, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered officials to end the state of “neither war nor peace”. Pezeshkian said Iran was ready to negotiate but would not yield to coercion. Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf told Al Jazeera that “the ball is now in the American court”.

A frozen conflict has no strict legal definition. The term generally refers to a conflict where large-scale fighting has stopped or sharply declined, but no peace agreement or political settlement has resolved the underlying issues. Skirmishes, blockades, economic pressure and periodic flare-ups can continue.

The war began in February, when the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran. Talks in Pakistan in April led to a memorandum of understanding in June that paused fighting and briefly lifted the US blockade. The truce collapsed within weeks, mainly over disagreements about control of the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington reimposed its naval blockade on July 14.

“Diplomatically, we are already there and have been since July, when the June memorandum fell apart,” said Muhanad Seloom, an assistant professor in critical security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. But he said “frozen” “flatters” a conflict involving a US blockade, more than one attack on shipping around Hormuz a day, and strikes in both directions.

The US has carried out limited strikes, including against Iranian air defence systems on Qeshm Island. Iran has attacked tankers using what it calls unauthorised routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Trade intelligence firm Kpler reported that five commodity vessels crossed the strait on November 7, and none crossed the following day, despite US claims that it was escorting ships.

“The war has changed form, from an air campaign to a siege,” Seloom told Al Jazeera, “and sieges end when the besieged side either breaks or breaks out”.

Trump faces political risks from escalating the conflict. An October Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that nearly 70 percent of Americans believed the war was not worth fighting, while polls have consistently indicated deep opposition to sending troops to Iran. After the midterm losses, Vance wrote on X that anyone who believed the war was worth “losing the Senate for the next 6 years” should say so openly.

“With support for the war at 31 percent and Congress just lost, a ground operation is close to unsellable,” Seloom said. Yet ending the war on current terms would also be difficult for Washington. Lifting the blockade, which is designed to stop Iranian oil exports, while leaving control of the Strait of Hormuz contested would leave Trump with little to show for eight months of war, the article says.

The Associated Press has reported that Trump conceded that leaving Iran’s current government in place would amount to a “defeat”. Tallha Abdulrazaq, a researcher at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, said: “Ironically, there is no military solution that does not involve a ground component.” He said Trump was reluctant to commit ground forces and the public was “wary of another Iraq or Afghanistan”. Abdulrazaq added that “this conflict will drag on as neither side is willing to back down on their negotiating positions”.

Abdulrazaq said Trump wants a deal that goes beyond the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated under President Barack Obama. The agreement required restrictions on uranium enrichment and regular inspections. Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA during his first term. “He simply has no political wiggle room to accept a deal similar to it, and the Iranians are in no mood to even give him those terms,” Abdulrazaq said.

Abdulrazaq said Trump must either try to win decisively or accept lesser terms. Otherwise, the conflict could “stay frozen with the odd bit of tit-for-tat retaliation from either side”. He said a serious US-initiated escalation would most likely come within the next two months, before Congress formally comes under Democratic control. Republicans hold slim majorities in the outgoing Congress until January, giving Trump “a narrow window of opportunity”, Abdulrazaq said. Three US carrier strike groups are likely to remain in the region through December.

Beyond that window, Abdulrazaq said, the White House would prefer “no war, no peace”. He said Washington believes “correctly” that the US can withstand more economic pain than Iran. Seloom warned, however, that the siege around the Strait of Hormuz could end if its costs rise. “American deaths, a Hormuz shock that lifts fuel prices again, or intelligence that Tehran is moving its 440kg of highly enriched uranium would each end it,” he said.

Iran has set seven conditions for a formal ceasefire, reopening the strait and resuming peace talks. They include lifting the US naval blockade, sanctions relief, releasing frozen funds and ending hostilities on all fronts, including by Israel in Lebanon and against Iran’s allies in Yemen and Iraq. Ghalibaf has said the Strait of Hormuz could then reopen, but it will “never return” to its pre-war, toll-free status.

Iran’s economy is under severe strain from the blockade, decades of sanctions and renewed US pressure on countries and entities trading with it since the war began. The country’s official statistics agency reported that the economy contracted by 10.1 percent year-on-year between March and June. The central bank put annual inflation at 83.8 percent in September, and the rial has repeatedly hit record lows.

“Tehran’s primary non-kinetic option is engaging in diplomacy through regional mediators like Qatar,” Abdulrazaq said. He added: “But Iran isn’t willing to cut a deal on the US’s terms, so the economic pressure will create ever-increasing desperate circumstances for the regime to contend with.” He said Iran was trying to weather US sanctions by increasing reliance on Chinese oil purchases, but the blockade was hindering those efforts.

“Tehran’s only good move is a deniable one, worked through security channels,” Seloom said. “The Qatari formula would put inspectors back into the bombed sites as the blockade comes off.” He also cited a possible “Sadat option”, a limited war to force negotiations, comparing it with how Egypt ended its “no war, no peace” stalemate in 1973. “Ghalibaf’s talk of ‘sustainable deterrence’ suggests some in Tehran are tempted,” he said.

Abdulrazaq said Iran could choose to escalate by attacking Gulf Arab energy producers to break the blockade and sanctions, causing global economic disruption and increasing pressure on the Trump administration to negotiate on terms favourable to Tehran.

Historical examples show that frozen conflicts can last for decades. The Korean War ended with an armistice in July 1953 but no peace treaty; more than 70 years later, North and South Korea remain technically at war, separated by a heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone. In eastern Ukraine, ceasefires under the Minsk agreements failed to settle the conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists. The front line barely moved for nearly eight years before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Nagorno-Karabakh offers an example of a frozen conflict ending when the balance of power shifts. A 1994 ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan held for a quarter of a century. Azerbaijan reignited the war in 2020 and retook the disputed territory entirely in 2023.

Analysts say territorial conflicts such as Korea and Russia-Ukraine are imperfect comparisons for the US-Israel war on Iran. Seloom said a closer parallel was Iraq between 1991 and 2003: “a regime that survived a war and then 12 years of embargo and periodic strikes, four of them without inspectors”. Abdulrazaq pointed to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when both sides sought to cripple the other’s oil exports. The resulting “Tanker War” involved attacks on shipping and missile strikes on energy facilities.

Unlike most frozen conflicts, which centre on disputed territory and a fixed front line, the US-Iran confrontation affects international shipping lanes, sanctions and energy markets. Seloom said the Iraq comparison fails at Hormuz: “Saddam’s containment sat on Iraqi territory, while this one sits on a waterway that carried about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas before the war”.

The Strait of Hormuz’s importance makes a stable freeze harder to sustain, the analysts said. Every tanker attack risks wider escalation, while a prolonged disruption could affect Gulf states, shippers and energy importers. Abdulrazaq said the global economy cannot indefinitely absorb a frozen conflict over such a vital chokepoint and that diversifying trade routes takes time and money. Qatar and Pakistan have an interest in breaking the deadlock, but Washington and Tehran both insist time is on their side.