The November 19 meeting in Shenzhen between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin will test whether the three powers can manage competing interests and maintain communication as the international system faces conflict, economic competition and technological rivalry.
Expectations of a historic breakthrough should be treated with caution. The leaders have different priorities and conflicting strategic objectives. A more plausible outcome would be an effort to set limits on competition and preserve communication, rather than a comprehensive agreement on the future of international relations.
For Trump, the summit is an opportunity to show that US diplomacy can engage its principal strategic competitors without giving up Washington's position. His priorities include nuclear arms control, the conflict involving Iran and stabilising economic relations with China. A successful meeting, even without binding commitments, would support his claim that personal diplomacy can help resolve major disputes.
The nuclear issue highlights the limits of possible cooperation. The expiry of the New START treaty between Washington and Moscow in February removed the last major bilateral framework limiting their strategic nuclear arsenals. Trump wants China included in future arms control arrangements, but Beijing has little incentive to accept restrictions while its nuclear capabilities remain substantially smaller than those of the United States and Russia. A commitment to continue discussions may be possible; a new trilateral agreement would be more difficult.
Hosting the summit in Shenzhen gives Xi an opportunity to present Beijing as a centre of international diplomacy as it challenges American influence in trade, technology and security. China wants to avoid another escalation in its trade dispute with Washington, preserve access to international markets and reinforce its claim to a greater role in shaping global economic rules.
Xi's emphasis on open trade and multilateral cooperation at the APEC summit is politically significant. Beijing is positioning itself as a defender of economic openness while US restrictions on Chinese technology and advanced artificial intelligence chips remain a source of tension. China’s appeal to developing economies concerned about protectionism and fragmented supply chains, however, remains bound up with its strategic rivalry with Washington, particularly over Taiwan and technological supremacy.
Putin's room for manoeuvre is narrower. Appearing alongside Trump and Xi reinforces Moscow's claim to remain a major power despite Western sanctions and the continuing consequences of the war in Ukraine. The meeting could also give him direct political contact with Washington beyond bilateral negotiations or European diplomatic channels.
Ukraine remains a sensitive dividing line. The White House has indicated that the conflict is not expected to be a principal subject of the trilateral discussion, while Moscow wants it included in broader discussions about European security. Putin would benefit from any sign that Washington is prepared to consider Russian security demands, but a settlement imposed without Ukraine's participation would carry serious political and strategic risks. Xi has shown little enthusiasm for treating the conflict as an issue to be settled exclusively by three external powers.
The war involving Iran could test whether the leaders can find common ground. Washington wants to explore diplomatic support from Moscow and Beijing in containing the conflict. China has significant interests in regional energy supplies, while Russia has political and strategic ties with Tehran. Their interest in preventing a wider regional confrontation may overlap with that of the United States, though their preferred approaches and tolerance for American pressure are unlikely to be identical.
Trade restrictions, semiconductor supplies, artificial intelligence and investment rules are increasingly central to national security calculations. An understanding that prevents further deterioration in US-China relations could benefit international markets and reduce uncertainty for businesses across major supply chains. A temporary trade accommodation, however, would not resolve the structural competition between the two economies.
Comparisons with the 1945 Yalta Conference may be tempting, but can be misleading. The prospect of Washington, Beijing and Moscow setting broad parameters for international affairs without smaller countries raises concerns in Europe and elsewhere. Today's international system is more complex than the post-war order: neither Russia nor China can simply dictate regional outcomes, and the United States cannot expect its partners to accept decisions made without their involvement.
For countries such as Azerbaijan, changes in relations between Washington and Moscow could affect the diplomatic environment around the South Caucasus. China's interest in the Middle Corridor also adds to the strategic importance of Azerbaijan's transport and connectivity infrastructure. Any shift in the balance among the three powers could bring opportunities as well as uncertainties for regional states seeking to protect their sovereignty and economic interests.
The Shenzhen meeting will ultimately be judged by what follows, including whether Washington and Beijing preserve their fragile economic understanding, whether the three powers establish a framework for nuclear dialogue, and whether Iran becomes an area of limited cooperation or further confrontation. Another question is whether Moscow can improve its diplomatic position without securing concessions at Ukraine's expense.
The most consequential result may be modest: an agreement to keep talking, avoid uncontrolled escalation and recognise that none of the three powers can manage the international system entirely on its own. That would not amount to a new world order, but preventing further instability may itself be a significant diplomatic achievement.
